THAT Debate, and the Beauty of Hindsight


Today’s first witness is Ian Shanks, who was the Lloyds …

Comment on THAT Debate, and the Beauty of Hindsight by easyJambo.

Today’s first witness is Ian Shanks, who was the Lloyds Bank’s relationship manager for the club at the time of the Whyte takeover.

easyJambo Also Commented

THAT Debate, and the Beauty of Hindsight
gunnerb May 13, 2017 at 17:53 
Received this link is in an email this morning from my bro-in-law. He highlighted the fact that TRFC are not listed and suggested that this might mean no license to play in uefa competitions ?
I don’t think that’s the case.

It is more likely that the 5 year cycle of Oldco’s coefficient points (the last ones earned on their day trips to Malmo and Maribor in 2011/12) have just dropped off the list.

The newco will just get Scotland’s basic coefficient figure for teams that haven’t featured in Europe for the previous five seasons.

THAT Debate, and the Beauty of Hindsight
Smugas May 13, 2017 at 09:31
The SPA commitments were £18m debt to Lloyds, £2.8m for the WTC, £1.7m for the H&S issue, £5m working capital and £5M per year investment in the playing squad for four years, for a total of £47.5m.

I’m not sure whether or not JJ has the £8m RFC Ticketus liability correct, as I don’t know if the £8m borrowing occurred during season 2009/10, 2010/11 or both.  There was mention of an £8m advance by the Advocate Depute during McGill’s evidence on 9th May, although I wasn’t in court that day.

James Doleman tweeted the following, on 9th May, suggesting that the £8m referred to was during season 2009/10 in respect of STs for season 2010/11:
Advocate Depute shows agreement between Ticketus and Whyte to sell £20m worth of season tickets, notes in previous season RFC borrowed £8m

A day or two earlier an unspecified RFC Ticketus liability, which sounded as if it related to season 2010/11, was also mentioned in court while I was present. However, I wasn’t 100% certain that I had picked up the information correctly, and the point wasn’t followed up so I didn’t get confirmation one way or another.

Incidentally, Lloyds had apparently set a limit on Ticketus funding of £5M.   Again on 9th May, when Findlay was cross examining McGill, James Doleman tweeted:
Letter from Bank of Scotland to Rangers from 2009, mentions £34m credit facility agreed in 2004.
Document goes on to say bank limited any borrowing from Ticketus over £5m and must be repaid by June

It’s probably not widely known, but Whyte actually made two payments back to Ticketus during his brief tenure.  From the D&P creditors report of 5 April 2012, it notes that Whyte repaid £3m in June 2011 and £5m in September 2011. However, he also borrowed a further £5m in September 2011 (probably the same £5m he repaid), by mortgaging a fourth season’s STs.

It is not clear whether or not the £8m repaid related to earlier borrowing by RFC, or was in fact the amount due to be repaid from STs from 2011/12 for Whyte’s first year of his initial three year deal.

From other documents that I’ve kept, Ticketus provided circa £20.3m in May 2011 and £5m in September 2011.  In the civil action Ticketus v Whyte, the claim was for £18.2m and the amount awarded was £17.7m, being the net exposure of Ticketus without interest or the expected profit.

The above figures suggest to me that the repayments made by Whyte were in respect of the first year of his deal rather than any previous borrowing by RFC.

I also note that Ticketus’ creditor claim against RFC (2012) was £26.7m, which may be the total amount outstanding that Ticketus would have expected to receive from RFC over the remainder of the Whyte deal. 

THAT Debate, and the Beauty of Hindsight
StevieBC May 11, 2017 at 15:02 
Just a general observation, about life in general. 
I am thinking that a duped person can actually be the ‘duper’ ?
Indubitably 12

Recent Comments by easyJambo

Fergus McCann v David Murray
Given that the blog has reverted to its seemingly inescapable time warp relating to events of 8-10 years ago, it is appropriate to mark the 10th anniversary of an event that set the ball rolling in contributing to
the sale of RFC for £1, its financial collapse and subsequent consequences of administration, 
liquidation, as well as Res 12. 

That event was HMRC's success in the Aberdeen Asset Management FTTT, the decision for which was published on 29 October 2010

RFC, who operated a similar Discounted Option tax avoidance scheme, had actually been presented with a Tax assessment as early as September 2007, which they appealed.  Their appeal was put on hold pending the outcome of the AAM case. Following the decision, HMRC issued RFC with a new offer to settle the following month.

The rest, as they say, is history and "in the past it must remain".  No matter how many times the blog returns to the events of 8-10 years ago, no-one in the football authorities or in the SMSM is listening, nor are they likely to change their mind now.

I believe that it is now time to move on. Not to forget what happened, but to move on all the same.

That is what I plan to do.

Fergus McCann v David Murray
bect67 26th October 2020 at 20:05

Probably an unfair question, but could you venture an opinion (for the less financially astute members of our community e.g. me!) as to what the comparable returns for TRFC might look like – assuming, in a break from their 8-year old tradition (?) that these be ‘unpockled’?


You are correct. It is an unfair question mail, but we should get sight of the accounts in the next month or so.

We know they had a forecast £10m shortfall in last year’s accounts. That was almost certainly reduced by their unbudgeted extra EL revenue.  We also know that DK provided a £5m loan facility. We can also state with some certainty that Park, Letham and Taylor plus Gibson provided additional funding which has since been converted to equity in the recent share issue.

They will show a loss, albeit that it will have been covered by the loans/share issue. How much is still outstanding is anyone’s guess.   

They have operated with year on year losses, but despite the doom mongers forecasts they have found a way to remain afloat and grow their business, improving the strength of their squad and on-field performances year on year.

They may forecast further shortfalls for this current year, perhaps with yet another share issue, but there is nothing to suggest that their business plan is failing.  Indeed, they appear to be getting stronger on and off the park.  Their new merchandising deal appears to be working and bringing in additional revenue (I don’t know if SD walked away, with or without cash, or declined to make a matching offer).  They have also sold out their 46,500 ST allocation, meaning that their match day revenue will be as high as it can be in the circumstances.

Covid restrictions will still impact them, but I do think that they are in as good a shape as most other Premiership clubs to come out the other side relatively unscathed. 

Fergus McCann v David Murray
The fall in Celtic’s revenue is across all areas.

Football Operations down £7.5m
Merchandising down £3m
Multimedia and other Commercial activities down £2.7m

This current season could be even more challenging with the increased liabilities and reduced income. The club has also increased its revolving credit facility from £2m to £13m (still unused) just in case.

Fergus McCann v David Murray
Current liabilities  2020 2019 

Trade and other payables     20,744     13,957

Lease liabilities    604       –

Borrowings  1,364     1,364

Provisions    5,942      3,479

Deferred income    21,275    25,614

Totals                    49,929     44,414

Looking at the above figures I was trying to work out the ongoing liabilities for deferred wages.  I don’t know if it will be included in the £6.8m increase in Trade and Other Payables, or in the £2.5m increase in Provisions.

The drop in deferred income suggests a fall of £4.2m in Season Ticket revenue.

Fergus McCann v David Murray
The previous post should read "cash in the bank down"

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